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Re-Examining Hearsay Under the Federal Rules:
Some Method for the Madness
Paul S. Milich*
I. INTRODUCTION
The hearsay rule has never been particularly "user friendly."
Called "bizarre,"' a "crazy quilt," 2 and an "unintelligible thicket," 3
its conceptual intricacies have long confounded scholars and ap-
pellate courts, in addition to the trial judges and litigators who
often analyze difficult hearsay problems in the heat of trial.4
The drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the early 1970s
provided an excellent opportunity to review the hearsay doctrine
and design a set of coherent, easily applied rules to make the
doctrine more manageable at trial. The drafters achieved notable
progress with rules regarding the classification and organization of
admissions and with specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
definition of hearsay, however, remains a source of confusion,
complication, and conflicting arguments.
Scholars criticize the federal definition of hearsay as incoherent
from a principled standpoint, ill-conceived from a policy stand-
point, and unworkable from a practical standpoint.' These scholars
typically conclude their critiques with proposals to reformulate the
federal hearsay definition. 6 As desirable as such a reformulation
Associate Dean and Professor of. Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
B.A. 1974, University of California, San Diego; J.D. 1980, Georgetown University Law
Center. The author thanks Dean Marjorie Knowles and Georgia State University for
financial support for this research and Steven Kaminshine for his helpful reviews of several
drafts of this work.
1. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW' 135 (1973).
2. Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L.
Rav. 909, 921 (1937).
3. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 741, 742 (1961).
4. See generally id.; McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489
(1930); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 177 (1948); Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331 (1961).
5. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, HAN'DBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § § 801.7-801'.10, at 712-
19 (2d ed. 1986); Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsav, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339,
1391-94 (1987). See generally Wellborn, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1982).
6. M. GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 801.10, at 718-19; Wellborn, supra note 5, at 92-93.
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may be, no change is anticipated in the foreseeable future. In the
meantime, thousands of courts must operate under the current
federal definition.7 Trial judges and lawyers grappling with difficult
hearsay issues will find case law and commentary pointing in
inconsistent directions.
This Article attempts to clarify the federal definition of hearsay
and offer some simple, reliable methods for analyzing difficult
issues under the definition. The Article begins by describing the
hodgepodge of approaches that courts have taken in interpreting
the federal definition. Next, the Article describes the nature of the
hearsay problem and why efforts to design a workable definition
of hearsay have proved so difficult. Part III discusses the different
interpretations given to the term "assertion" in Federal Rule 801's
definition of hearsay and presents a case for one such interpreta-
tion, as well as a simple method for correctly applying that
interpretation. Part IV explores the problem of distinguishing
hearsay from nonhearsay and offers several tests to make that
task simpler and more coherent. The Article concludes by applying
the principles and methods suggested to several cases that pose
difficult hearsay issues.
II. A JUDICIAL HODGEPODGE
Federal cases reveal an astonishing variety of inconsistent appli-
cations of the federal hearsay definition to the basic question, "Is
it hearsay?" 9 Consider the following hypothetical.
The defendant, Don Jones, is charged with hiring Max, a
professional killer, to murder his wife for $5,000 cash and a gold
Rolex watch. Max also is charged with the crime, but will be tried
separately, and refuses to testify at Don's trial. The prosecution
offers the following three pieces of evidence at Don's trial: (1)
The detective who arrested Max will testify that when she told
Max that they had just arrested Don, Max said "Tell Don he'd
better get me a good lawyer;" (2) one page from a small notebook
found in Max's apartment with the entry "Don Jones - 225-1112
- $5,000 and Rolex;" and (3) a gold Rolex watch with "D.
7. Thirty-five states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence or their substantial
equivalent and 34 have adopted the federal definition of hearsay. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 801(a)-(c) [02] (1984 & Supp. 1990) (hereinafter WEIN-
STEIN'S].
8. See cases cited infra notes 10-22; Wellborn, supra note 5, at 71 ("The final result,
then, may be that worst of all possible worlds: arbitrary distinctions applied inconsistently
after pointless, troublesome quarrels.").
9. See cases discussed in Wellborn, supra note 5, at 83-91.
[Vol. 39
RE-EXAMINING HEARSAY
Jones" engraved on the back, also found in Max's apartment.
A definition of hearsay should provide a coherent and consistent
means of determining whether this evidence falls within the hearsay
rule. Courts faced with this kind of evidence, however, often use
widely different methods to determine whether these pieces of
evidence are hearsay under the federal definition.
Regarding the statement, "Tell Don he'd better get me a good
lawyer," some courts would exclude the comment as hearsay,
reasoning that the proponent offered it to prove the implied
assertion that Max believed Don was obliged to hire a lawyer for
him. 10 Other courts would conclude that such a statement is not
hearsay because it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, and because the federal definition of hearsay does not
cover implied assertions." Finally, some courts would find that
because the out-of-court expression'is an order or direction, it is
not an assertion, and therefore not hearsay under the federal
definition.' 2
The second item of evidence is the page from the notebook with
the entry "Don Jones - 225-1112 - $5,000 and Rolex." Some
courts would exclude this as hearsay because it asserts the implied
proposition that Max knows a Don Jones with this phone number
who has paid or promised to pay $5,000 and a Rolex watch for
some service. 3 Other courts would admit the page as nonhearsay
circumstantial evidence of association between Max and the defen-
dant. 4 Some courts would find that the page poses no, hearsay
problem because nothing is "asserted."'" Others might admit the
name and phone number to prove that Max knew the defendant,
but only if the accuracy of the phone number was independently
established.' 6 Finally, some courts might admit the page as non-
10. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 101-04 (3d Cir. 1983); Lyle v.
Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 880-81
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
11. See, e.g., Lyle, 720 F.2d at 436-40 (Porter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1478 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1006 (1987); United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 514 (loth Cir. 1984); see
also Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 n.6 (5th Cir.
1975).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Duarte, 718 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120, 1124 (6th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
922 (1982).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States
v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1975).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Saint Prix, 672 F.2d 1077, 1083 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1980).
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hearsay if offered to imply from Max's behavior that he believed
Don had paid or promised to pay the money and the watch. 7
The third piece of evidence is the inscribed Rolex watch. Some
courts would find that the inscription "D. Jones" asserts that the
watch at some time belonged to "D. Jones", and because the
watch is offered to prove the truth of that assertion, it is hearsay.'
Other courts might find that the inscription is not an assertion, 9
or that it is "neutral ' 20 and thus not hearsay. A court might
determine that the inscription is not offered for its truth, but only
to identify real evidence and thus is not hearsay. 21 Other courts
would find that the inscribed watch is not hearsay but rather is
circumstantial evidence or a mechanical trace that links the watch
to the defendant. 22
The existence of these different approaches and answers to the
fundamental question, "Is this evidence hearsay?" reflects the
basic interpretive confusion with the federal definition of hearsay.
Before examining the federal definition in detail, it will be helpful
to review what makes hearsay difficult to define.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH HEARSAY
A. A Credibility Problem
An out-of-court statement is hearsay when offered as proof that
what the declarant said was true. The inferences take the following
basic form: 23
(1) The out-of-court declarant said "X";
(2) people do not normally say "X" unless they believe "X" is true;
(3) therefore, the declarant probably believed "X" was true;
(4) people are not normally mistaken in their beliefs about facts within
their personal knowledge and experience;"
17. See, e.g., United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1147, different result on rehearing
on other grounds, 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1983).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Cowley, 720 F.2d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984); Payne v. Janasz, 711 F.2d 1305, 1313-14 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1019 (1983).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 31 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 958 (1983).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 155 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. See generally Morgan, supra note 4, at 177-79; Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87
HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974).
24. Neither in-court nor out-of-court statements are admissible unless based on the
speaker's personal knowledge, FED. R. EvID. 602, and in compliance with FED. R. EvID.
701-05 concerning lay and expert opinions.
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(5) therefore, "X" probably is true.
The two key premises in lines two and four are the source of
the hearsay risk. The first assumes that the out-of-court declarant
was not lying and did not misspeak. The second assumes that the
declarant was not mistaken in the perception or memory of the
event.
Hearsay risks exist when the evidence invites the jury to rely on
the out-of-court declarant's sincerity, communication skill, percep-
tion, and memory. 25 Without cross-examination of the declarant,
the jury has insufficient evidence to intelligently assess these fac-
tors.2 6 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the jury probably
will conclude that the declarant was a normal person who believed
what was stated and was not mistaken about that belief. If the
declarant, in fact, has below average credibility for one reason or
another, the inability to cross-examine the declarant may cause the
jury to overvalue the declarant's credibility. 27 Without the rule
excluding hearsay, such evidence could be offered instead of live
testimony whenever counsel does not want to expose a witness's
below average credibility to cross-examination.
On the other hand, not all out-of-court statements create a
credibility problem. If an out-of-court statement is offered for
some purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted,
it is not hearsay. For example, testimony that a murder victim
told the accused, "I am in love with your wife," could be offered
to prove that the accused heard the statement and thus had a
motive to kill the declarant. The probative value of this evidence
does not depend on the inferences that the declarant believed what
he said and that what he believed was probably true. Thus the
declarant's credibility in this instance is not in issue. Whether or
not the declarant truly believed he was in love with the defendant's
wife is irrelevant. The fact that he said it to the accused is enough
to supply motive.
B. The Scope of Hearsay Evidence
It is clear that a prosecutor cannot offer the out-of-court state-
ment "Joe killed Bob" to prove that fact. Although this infor-
mation is important, the declarant cannot be cross-examined as to
25. See, e.g., 5 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAlS AT COMMON LAW § § 1362-63 (1974);
Morgan, supra note 4, at 178-179; Wellbom, supra note 5, at 52-53.
26. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 1363.
27. See Swift, supra note 5, at 1345; Note, The Theoretical Foundations of the Hearsay
Rules, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1786, 1788 (1980).
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whether he or she was lying or mistaken. Anytime an uncross-
examined declarant is the source of information offered at trial,
it should follow that the hearsay rule applies. Consider, however,
the many ways in which something a person says or does out of
court can be used in court to prove a fact. For example, to prove
that Joe is a good shot with a rifle, the proponent might offer a
witness who will testify as to any of the following out-of-court
statements or actions:
(1) I heard Ted say, "Joe is a good shot with a rifle." (This is
a direct expression of the fact in question.).
(2) I heard Ted say, "Joe can shoot a tick off a running jaguar
at two hundred yards." (This is an indirect, implied expression of
the fact in question.).
(3) I heard Ted say, "Joe's father was a marksman and taught
Joe how to shoot when Joe was ten." (This is a direct expression
of certain facts which, if true, support an inference to the fact in
question.).
(4) 1 heard Ted say, "You ought to go hunting with Joe." (This
is an expression, in this case a recommendation, that implies the
declarant's belief in the fact in question.).
(5) I heard Ted say, "Have you ever seen anyone shoot a rifle
like Joe?" (This question implies that the declarant believes the
fact in question.).
(6) I saw Ted point to Joe when asked, "Who is the best shot
in the county." (This is nonverbal conduct used to express the
fact in question.).
(7) I saw Joe sign up for a rifle shooting competition. (This is
evidence of Joe's nonverbal conduct used to support an inference
to the fact in question.).
(8) I saw Joe win a rifle shooting competition. (This is direct
evidence of the fact in question; good shooting is evidence of a
good shot.).
The list could go on almost endlessly. The many ways in which
out-of-court statements can inform the jury challenges a hearsay
definition to consistently differentiate between those that pose
hearsay risks and those that do not. Although most of the examples
above present such risks,n those risks may be diminished in some
28. Only example number eight involves no hearsay risks at all. The rest present some
variation of the hearsay inferences described above. For example, in number two, the
inferences are drawn as follows:
(I) Ted said, "Joe can shoot a tick off a running jaguar at two hundred yards."
(2) People normally would not say that unless they believed that Joe was a good
shot.
[Vol. 39
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cases29 and displaced in others.1 To the extent that some offers
of evidence pose less hearsay danger than others, the issue for a
hearsay definition is whether and where to draw the line excluding
dangerous hearsay and admitting less dangerous evidence. The
issue is one not only of principle, but also of policy and practi-
cality.
From a policy standpoint, the definition of hearsay should not
be too broad or too narrow. If the definition is too broad, it will
exclude probative, and perhaps even dispositive evidence from the
truth-finding process that, in fact, may raise little or no hearsay
risk. If the hearsay definition is too narrow, however, it sometimes
will admit dangerous hearsay, making the definition and the rule
seem arbitrary. From a practical standpoint, if the definition is
too complicated, it will ask too much of the trial bench and bar,
who likely will respond by ignoring the finer points of the defi-
nition.' If the definition is simplified too much, it will fail to take
account of the principled distinctions that determine whether out-
of-court evidence carries serious hearsay dangers.
The federal definition of hearsay has not satisfactorily resolved
these issues of policy and practicality. The lines drawn by the
federal definition to delineate the scope of hearsay are obscure.
The task, therefore, is to clarify the principles upon which the
federal definition is based in order to promote a coherent, workable
interpretation of the federal rule.
(3) Therefore, Ted believed that Joe was a good shot.
(4) People normally are not mistaken about their beliefs regarding matters within
their personal knowledge and experience.
(5) Therefore, Joe probably was a good shot. '
29. In example number 3, for instance, ("Joe's father was a marksman and taught
Joe how to shoot when Joe was ten,") it does not appear that the declarant was trying to
express her opinion that Joe currently is a good shot. This reduces the risk that the
declarant was using this out-of-court statement to lie about the fact in question. Likewise,
in example number seven, in which the witness saw Joe signing up for a rifle shooting
competition, it is unlikely that the actor was using the conduct to say anything, thus there
is less danger that he was lying.
30. From a practical standpoint, certain factors may reduce the apparent harm of
admitting the evidence even though the hearsay risks are undiminished. In example number
4, the out-of-court statement, "You ought to go hunting with Joe," is somewhat probative
that the declarant believed Joe was a good shot. It is also possible, however, that the
declarant did not believe this at all. The declarant may have recommended hunting with
Joe because Joe is a fun fellow or because Joe owns a nice cabin in the woods. The
inference offered from the statement is so attenuated that a jury probably would discount
it from the outset. Arguably, this displaces the hearsay concern that the jury will overvalue
the evidence because such evidence carries "on its face a warning to the jury against giving
the statement undue weight." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970).
31. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REv. 277, 279-84
(1952).
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IV. THE FEDERAL DEFINITION OF HEARSAY
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 states:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.3 2
Some argue that this definition and the advisory committee notes
that accompany it are an invitation to hopeless confusion.3 Al-
though the language of the Rule and the notes is confusing, the
situation is not hopeless.
Courts have experienced two major stumbling blocks in the
interpretation and application of Rule 801. The first is disagreement
and confusion over the meaning of the term "assertion" in 801(a),
and the second is difficulty in applying 801(c), which provides that
a statement is hearsay only if offered "to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. ' 34
A. Three Approaches to the Meaning of "Assertion"
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not define "assertion." For
example, the proponent offers Ted's out-of-court statement, "You
ought to go hunting with Joe," as evidence that Ted believed, and
thus Joe probably was, a good shot. Is this an oral "assertion"
under Rule 801(a)? If so, what precisely constitutes the "matter
asserted" under 801(c)?
There are at least three competing definitions of "assertion" at
work in the cases and commentary: (1) the dictionary definition
approach: "assertion" is any direct statement of fact; (2) the
Wright v. Tatham definition: "assertion" is any fact expressed or
implied by the statement; and, (3) the intent-based definition:
"assertion" is any fact the declarant intended to express or imply
with the statement. Only the intent-based definition, however,
provides a viable interpretation of Rule 801.
1. The Dictionary Definition Approach
The dictionary definition approach interprets "assertion" in Rule
801 according to its ordinary meaning-a direct statement of fact.35
32. FED. R. Evm. 801(a)-(c).
33. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 71.
34. FED. R. Evn). 801(c).
35. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 131 (Gove ed. 1981) ("asserts:
... to state or affirm positively, assuredly, plainly .... or strongly...").
900 [Vol. 39
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Thus, only direct statements of fact offered to prove the truth of
the matter directly stated are hearsay. Under this interpretation,
Rule 801 excludes all "implied assertions" from the definition of
hearsay.3 6 One commentator called this interpretation the "most
plausible" from the text of Rule 801, but also "the most unat-
tractive .. . from the standpoint of hearsay principles and pol-
icy." 3 7 This interpretation is not only unattractive, it is less plausible
than the intent-based definition.
The dictionary definition approach is unattractive because it guts
the hearsay rule. Recall the earlier example of the out-of-court
statement, "Joe can shoot a tick off a running jaguar at two
hundred yards," offered to prove that Joe is a good shot. Because
the statement is not being offered to prove the matter directly
stated, (that Joe in fact can shoot a tick off a running jaguar at
two hundred yards), it does not constitute hearsay under the
dictionary definition of assertion. This leads to the bizarre result
that as long as the declarant exaggerates the truth, the statement
is admissible as nonhearsay to prove the underlying truth of the
matter.38
The dictionary definition of assertion also excludes from the
hearsay rule all out-of-court expressions that are not declarative
statements. Instructions, orders, recommendations, and questions,
being nondeclarative in form, are not "assertions on their face"
and thus not hearsay.3 9 This leads to even more absurd distinctions.
For example, the statement "Joe sells cocaine," offered to prove
that Joe sells cocaine, is hearsay, but the instruction, "Ask Joe
to sell you some cocaine," offered for the same purpose, is not.
By insisting that only declarative statements are assertions, the
dictionary definition places enormous importance on the mere form
of the out-of-court locution. Such heavy reliance presumes that
the in-court witness will recall the out-of-court expression exactly
as it was made; a dubious presumption.4 Moreover, making the
36. United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Zenni,
492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
37. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 71.
38. See, e.g., United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 979 (3d Cir. 1985) (out-of-court
statement by poker machine vendor that he "understood" the money he paid officer Ricci
went to "whoever was in the (police] district" was not hearsay because not offered to
prove everyone in the district would get the money but only that declarant believed the
payment to Ricci paid those involved in protection in that district).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1478 (1 1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1006 (1987); United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 514 (10th Cir. 1984);
Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 469.
40. See Morgan, supra note 4, at 198; Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
26 HARv. L. REv. 146, 150 n.13 (1912).
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hearsay issue turn on the mere form of the out-of-court statement
may tempt witnesses to "recall" the statement in a nondeclarative
form to circumvent the rule. 4'
The dictionary definition of assertion entails a radical departure
from common-law hearsay doctrine, 42 but there is no evidence that
the drafters of the federal definition of hearsay intended such a
departure. In light of the absurd results that such an interpretation
causes, a dictionary definition of "assertion" has nothing to
recommend it.
2. The Wright v. Tatham Approach to "Assertion"
Another definition of assertion has a common law trail leading
back to the famous English case of Wright v. Tatham.43 In Wright,
the proponent offered letters written to the testator discussing
business affairs to prove by implication that the writers believed
the testator to be mentally competent." The court held that this
implication, or "implied assertion," was hearsay. 45 The rationale
41. In Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974), different result on rehearing on
other grounds, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 824 (1975), the court noted
that if the hearsay rule covered only direct assertions of fact, "the hearsay rule could easily
be circumvented through clever questioning and coaching of witnesses, so that answers
were framed as implied rather than as direct assertions." Id. at 928. This practice was
condemned in United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 675 (2d Cir. 1978), in which the
witness, an undercover agent, tried to circumvent the hearsay rule by testifying in a manner
that did not directly restate, but only implied, what an out-of-court informer told him.
But see United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1300 (9th Cir. 1984) (the court essentially
invites circumvention of the rule); United States v. Walker, 636 F.2d 194, 195 (8th Cir.
1980) (the court demonstrated a more lenient attitude towards such circumvention of the
hearsay rule).
42. In 1970, while work was proceeding on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the United
States Supreme Court decided Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The prosecution
offered the out-of-court statement, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex
Evans, we wouldn't be in this now," to prove the implication that the declarant believed
Evans committed the murder. Id. at 77. The Court never questioned that this was hearsay.
Under a dictionary definition of "assertion," however, the statement is not offered to
prove the matter directly stated (that the declarant would not be in trouble but for Evans),
and therefore falls outside the hearsay rule. See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440 (1949) (conversation among several women arrested for prostitution in which the
declarant suggested that the women take the blame, rather than Kay, the defendant, because
he couldn't stand prison, was hearsay when offered to prove the declarant's belief that the
defendant was really to blame); Wellborn, supra note 5, at 85-87.
43. 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (1838). Modern English law apparently remains unsettled on
whether implied assertions are hearsay. CRoss, EVIDENCE 469-73 (5th ed. 1979). Professor
Cross submits that the better rule "only applies to statements intended by their makers to
be assertive." Id. at 472.
44. Wright, 7 Eng. Rep. at 559-60.
45. Id. at 595-96.
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in Wright focused on the fact that the declarants' implied beliefs
as to the testator's competence were untested by cross-examination
and posed the hearsay risks that the declarants were mistaken or
being misunderstood.4 This reasoning leads to a broad definition
of assertion. Under this approach, if the proponent offers the
statement as proof that the declarant believed some fact, whether
that fact was expressed or implied by the statement, it is an
assertion and therefore subject to the federal hearsay rule.
In the search for the proper interpretation of the hearsay rule,
the issue is not whether Wright represents a better approach, but
whether Rule 801 adopted this approach. Although some have
urged such a broad reading of assertion, 4' even the leading pro-
ponent of this view concedes that the advisory committee notes to
the federal rules contradict it.4
The text of Rule 801 itself does not support a Wright v. Tatham
approach. Subsection (a)(2) rejects this approach in cases of non-
verbal conduct. For example, to prove that it was raining at the
time, witnesses testify that they saw Mary opening her umbrella
as she was walking out the door. Under the Wright v. Tatham
approach, this evidence is hearsay because Mary's conduct implies
that she believed it was raining and her belief implies that it was,
in fact, raining. But the language of Rule 801(a)(2) points to a
result at odds with the Wright v. Tatham approach: "Nonverbal
conduct of a person" qualifies as a potential hearsay statement
only "if it is intended by the person as an assertion." Opening
an umbrella normally is not intended to be an assertion about
anything, and, thus, such nonverbal conduct does not fall within
the federal definition of hearsay.
The Wright v. Tatham approach is therefore at odds with the
federal definition of hearsay. The language of Rule 801 precludes
it in cases of nonverbal conduct and the advisory committee notes
46. The circumstantial argument incorporates the telltale hearsay inferences:
(1) The letter writer discussed business affairs in his letter to the addressee.
(2) People normally do not discuss business affairs with someone they believe is
incompetent.
(3) Therefore, the letter writer probably believed that the addressee was competent.
(4) People normally are not mistaken about their beliefs concerning matters within
their personal knowledge and experience.
(5) Therefore, the addressee probably was competent.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 102-03 (3d Cir. 1983); Graham,
"Stickperson Hearsay ": A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 906-10.
48. Graham, supra note 47, at 906-10, 921 n.75.
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reject it in cases of verbal conduct. Consequently, the approach
has gained very little judicial acceptance.4 9
3. The Intent Definition of "Assertion"
The advisory committee notes to Rule 801(a) state, "The effect
of the definition of 'statement' is to exclude from the operation
of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal,
not intended as an assertion. The key to the definition is that
nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one." 50 The notes
discuss this distinction between assertive and nonassertive conduct
chiefly in terms of nonverbal conduct. When the context shows
that an actor's nonverbal conduct is intended to communicate
something (assertive conduct), that communication is hearsay when
offered to prove the truth of the facts so communicated.' When
an actor's conduct is not intended to communicate (nonassertive
conduct), any facts inferred from that conduct are not hearsay. 2
Scholars have long debated how extensively the hearsay rule
should regulate the use of nonverbal conduct to draw inferences
as to what the actor knew or believed." The advisory committee
embraced the argument that when an actor is not using nonverbal
conduct to communicate, there is little danger that the actor is
using the conduct to lie, and this reduced risk of insincerity justifies
freeing such nonassertive conduct from the hearsay rule. 4 For
example, consider two instances of nonverbal conduct, both offered
to prove that the actor owns a particular Buick automobile. In
the first, the actor responds to the question "which car do you
own?" by pointing to the Buick. Using general hearsay inferences,
we infer from this conduct that the actor believed the car was
hers, and from that belief we infer that the Buick probably was
hers. In the second, the actor is observed sitting in the parked
Buick, behind the wheel, reading a newspaper. We infer that the
49. See Wellborn, supra note 5, at 81-82.
50. 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1973) (FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's notes to
subdivision (a)).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Caro, 569 F.2d 411, 416-17 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978); M.
GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 801.2 at 690-91.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983).
53. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 801.3, at 694; Wellborn, supra note 5, at
58-60.
54. For an example of this argument, see Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-
Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 133 (1961). Cf. Finman, Implied
Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 682, 686 (1962).
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actor would not be sitting in that car unless she believed that it
was hers, and from that belief we infer that the Buick belonged
to the actor. Both instances involve the hearsay risk that the actor
made a mistake by pointing at or getting into the wrong car. In
the latter instance, however, the risk of insincerity is diminished
because it is unlikely that the actor was using the conduct to
communicate a lie." Thus, the advisory committee notes single out
the risk of insincerity. When that risk is diminished by a lack of
communicative intent, it frees the evidence from the hearsay rule,
despite the persistence of the hearsay risk that the actor was
mistaken.16
The advisory committee notes state that "[sjimilar considera-
tions" to those governing nonverbal conduct govern verbal con-
duct.57 The notes presume that verbal statements of fact are
intended by the declarant to communicate the facts stated.58 Thus,
if the declarant said "It is raining," that utterance is an assertion,
and is hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Suppose, however, that the declarant said: "If I go outside, I will
get wet." This could be offered to prove the matter directly
asserted, (that if the declarant goes outside he will get wet), or to
prove the implication that it was raining at the time the statement
was made. If offered to prove the implication, the issue is whether
the implication is an implied assertion; that is, whether the de-
clarant intended to communicate that implication with his state-
ment.
This analysis helps clarify the advisory committee's cryptic com-
ment that "nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which
is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other
than the matter asserted [are] also excluded from the definition of
hearsay . . . .,"9 "Nonassertive verbal conduct," by definition, is
not intended to communicate. 6° Verbal conduct intended to convey
55. Falknor, supra note 54, at 136-37.
56. The advisory committee notes state:
Admittedly evidence of this character is untested with respect to the perception,
memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor, but the Advisory
Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the absence of an
intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds.
56 F.R.D. 183, 294 (FED. R. EVID. 801, advisory committee's note to subdivision (a)).
57. Id.
58. The advisory committee notes state: "It can scarcely be doubted that an assertion
made in words is intended by the declarant to be an assertion. Hence verbal assertions
readily fall into the category of 'statement.' " Id. at 293-94.
59. Id. at 294.
60. Examples of totally nonassertive verbal conduct are rare, because any use of words
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one fact may be offered to prove a different fact that the declarant
did not intend to communicate. 6
The rationale for using an intent-based definition of assertion
is the same for verbal and nonverbal conduct: the risk of insincerity
is reduced when the declarant does not intend to communicate the
fact in question. 62 For example, to prove that a person believed a
particular Buick was safe to drive one could offer the out-of-court
statement "This Buick is safe." Alternatively, one might offer the
declarant's statement, "I want Joe to drive the Buick to Chicago
tomorrow," when Chicago is two hundred miles away. Under the
federal definition of hearsay, the former statement that the Buick
is safe is hearsay if offered to prove that fact, but the latter is
not. In the latter statement, there appears to be no intent by the
declarant to say anything about the safety of the car. Yet, the
expressed desire that Joe drive the Buick to Chicago is consistent
with an unexpressed belief that the car is safe. Because the de-
clarant did not intend to say that the car was safe, there is less
danger that the declarant was using this statement to lie about
that fact. 63 Although the risk that the declarant was mistaken
about the car's safety persists, the advisory committee's approach
accepts the reduced risk of insincerity as sufficient to free the
evidence from the hearsay rule.
usually is tied to communication of something. Examples might include talking to one's
self, talking to an Irish Setter, or reading a part for a play. See M. GRARAM, supra note
5, § 801.3, at 695.
61. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 717 (4th
ed. 1986); WEINSTEIN'S, supra note 7, 801(a) [01].
62. See Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923, 927 (5th Cir. 1974), different result on rehearing
on other grounds, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975).
63. The risk of insincerity, however, is not eliminated entirely, because the inference
that the declarant believes that the car is safe cannot be drawn if the declarant was lying
about his or her desire that Joe drive the car on a long trip. Two risks of insincerity
operate here: (1) the general risk that the declarant was lying about anything or everything
(in which case any inferences from the statement will be invalid); and (2) the more specific
risk that the declarant used the out-of-court expression to communicate a lie about the
fact for which the expression is offered at trial. The latter risk speaks directly to the fear
that the out-of-court declarant fabricated facts relevant to the case. The advisory committee
suggests that a reduction in the latter risk is sufficient to free the evidence from the hearsay
rule despite the persistence of the general risk.
This kind of distinction is present in nonverbal conduct cases as well. For example,
suppose a personal injury plaintiff shows a video tape of himself jogging, taken before his
accident, to prove that he was active and engaged in exercise that he can no longer enjoy.
This evidence appears to be nonassertive and thus not hearsay. Yet, it remains possible
that the actor in fact hated jogging and made this video only to convince someone at the
time that he loved it. As the committee wrote, "No class of evidence is free of the
possibility of fabrication ...... but if that possibility is reduced, it may free the evidence
from the hearsay rule.
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In sum, any interpretation of the federal definition of hearsay
should recognize two facts: (1) the advisory committee endorsed
the argument that use of nonverbal conduct should be governed
by an intent-based distinction between assertive and nonassertive
conduct; and (2) the advisory committee applied this same distinc-
tion to the use of implications from verbal conduct. As a result,
"intent to communicate" is the key to distinguishing between
hearsay and nonhearsay under the federal definition. Thus, a
"statement" under Rule 801(a) is a fact that the declarant intended
to communicate orally, in writing, or with nonverbal conduct.
The intent-based definition of hearsay has been attacked both
as an illogical departure from traditional hearsay principles6 and
as an unworkable standard in practice. 65 The first criticism raises
points that deserve consideration if and when a reformulation of
the federal definition is undertaken. In the meantime, the courts
must apply this definition. The second criticism-that the definition
is unworkable-creates the most immediate concern.
B. Applying the Intent-Based Definition of Assertion
1. The Quest for the Declarant's Intent
Determining whether an actor intended to communicate with
nonverbal conduct presents a different and easier task than deter-
mining such intentions with respect to verbal conduct. Most non-
verbal conduct is nonassertive. Our daily behavior may speak
volumes to those who observe it closely, but few of our nonverbal
actions are meant to communicate. When we do intend to use
nonverbal conduct to communicate, the intent often is clear.
When we engage in verbal conduct, however, we almost always
intend to communicate something. Our words may speak volumes
to those who hear them but we intend to communicate only certain
meanings; we have only certain things "in mind." Thus, the quest
for the declarant's intent in cases of verbal conduct involves a
search for what the declarant truly had "in mind."
This sounds like an impossible task if viewed as a search inside
the declarant's head for a particular subjective intent. 6 For ex-
ample, suppose the proponent offers the declarant's out-of-court
statement, "I want Joe to drive the Buick to Chicago tomorrow,"
64. See M. GRAM, supra note 5, § 801.7, at 712-17.
65. See Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 437 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983); Wellborn, supra note
5, at 74-75, 81.
66. See Finman, supra note 54, at 687 n.16, 696-97.
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to prove the inference that the declarant believed the Buick was
safe to drive and therefore that it probably was safe to drive. An
inquiry under the federal definition of hearsay into whether the
declarant in fact intended to communicate that the Buick was safe
to drive runs into several difficulties.
There are numerous possibilities for what the declarant may
have intended to communicate with this statement, and they are
not mutually exclusive: (1) the direct meaning-the declarant wanted
Joe to drive the Buick to Chicago the next day; (2) an inference-
the declarant believed the Buick was safe to drive; (3) another
inference-the declarant believed Joe was capable of driving to
Chicago; (4) another inference-the declarant believed Joe would
agree to drive the car to Chicago; and so forth. The question
cannot be which proposition the declarant most likely intended to
communicate because proving that the declarant intended to express
one fact does not preclude the possibility that she also intended
to communicate other facts. Because a reduced risk of insincerity
flows only from unintended inferences, the question must be
whether the declarant intended to communicate the specific infer-
ence in question. 67
Because the declarant is presumably unavailable for cross-ex-
amination, the lawyers and trial judge are left to speculate as to
the declarant's actual intent. In the above example, the proponent
predictably will argue that the declarant only intended to express
her desire that Joe drive the Buick to Chicago and did not intend
to make any implied assertion about the safety of the car. The
statement, therefore, is not hearsay when offered to prove that
unintended implication. The opponent predictably will argue that
the statement makes little sense unless the declarant believed that
the Buick was safe to drive and, therefore, the statement is an
implied assertion and hearsay. Note that if the statement is ad-
mitted, the proponent and opponent will make nearly opposite
arguments to the jury. The proponent will invite the jury to infer
that the declarant believed that the Buick was safe to drive. The
opponent, however, will remind the jury that the declarant's state-
ment does not necessarily imply that she even considered the
Buick's safety. The fact that the lawyers are likely to make one
argument to the judge regarding admissibility and the opposite
argument to the jury regarding interpretation of the evidence
indicates how much self-serving speculation this quest for the
declarant's true subjective intent generates.
67. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 801.7, at 713-14.
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2. Toward a More Objective Test
To escape this speculative quest for the declarant's intent, one
must return to the purpose of the quest; to identify situations in
which it appears unlikely that the declarant was using the out-of-
court statement to lie about the fact in question. The declarant's
use of the language, together with certain basic assumptions about
liars, helps to objectively identify such situations.
A person who intends to lie will make some effort to convey
the false information with enough clarity and credibility that it
will be understood and, the liar hopes, accepted as true by the
listener. Thus, if the relationship between the out-of-court state-
ment and the inference for which it is offered in evidence is such
that the former would be a poor choice for a liar hoping to
communicate the latter, there is a reduced risk that the declarant
was using the expression to lie about the fact in question. For
example, if the declarant intended to assert a lie about the safety
of the Buick, it is unlikely that he would choose the expression,
"I want Joe to drive the Buick to Chicago tomorrow," to convey
that lie. The listener is unlikely to infer from this statement that
the Buick is safe to drive. Thus, we are less worried that the
declarant was using this statement to communicate a lie about the
fact in question. This reduced risk of insincerity is enough to free
this statement from the federal hearsay rule.
This leads to an objective, rather than subjective, test of the
declarant's intent under the federal definition of hearsay. The
focus shifts from trying to fathom what propositions the declarant
intended to communicate to whether the use for which the state-
ment is offered carries the usual hearsay risk of insincerity. If it
appears from the circumstances and the language used that the
declarant probably would not have used that particular locution
to lie about the fact in question, then the reduced risk of insincerity
frees the evidence from the definition of assertion and the federal
definition of hearsay.
3. A Test for Determining if the Offered Inference from the
Out-of-Court. Expression is an "Assertion"
Sometimes it will be clear from the circumstances that an out-
of-court statement was intended by the declarant to convey a
particular implication. For example, in Parks v. Huff' the declar-
ant told the witness that "the old man would get him and his
68. 493 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974), different result on rehearing on other grounds, 506
F.2d 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975).
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family" if the witness did not go through with a plan to kill a
local prosecutor. 69 Independent evidence established that in this
local community, defendant Park was widely known as "the old
man." ' 70 Thus, what otherwise might seem to be a vague reference
appeared, in context, to be an intentional implication that Parks
was behind the murder plot. 71 The court agreed that the statement
was hearsay. 72
The more difficult issues arise when it is not clear from the
circumstances whether the declarant intended to communicate a
particular implication by what was said. In these cases, the follow-
ing two-step analysis reveals whether using the out-of-court state-
ment to prove the implied proposition presents the kind of reduced
risk of insincerity that the federal definition seeks in its distinction
between assertive and nonassertive verbal conduct.
A. Step One. The first step is to determine the relevant purpose
for which the proponent is offering the statement by completing
the following sentence: the proponent offers this out-of-court
statement to prove that the declarant" believed: [proposition of
fact]. For example, in a fraud case the proponent offers the out-
of-court statement "Don't cash this check until Tuesday" to prove
that the declarant believed: [there were insufficient funds in the
account to cover the check until Tuesday].
B. Step Two. Assuming, for the purposes of this analysis, that
the proposition of fact the declarant allegedly believed was, in
fact, incontrovertibly false, was the declarant necessarily lying or
mistaken when he made the out-of-court statement? If so, this use
of the out-of-court statement is hearsay. 74
69. Park, 493 F.2d at 926.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 928. The statement, however, was admissible under the co-conspirator
exception.
73. The declarant is the person behind the expression. The declarant may use others
to make the expression (a secretary types the employer's letters, a jeweler engraves a watch)
but these others are not declarants.
74. This test is similar to the one suggested in 2 S. SALTZBURO AND M. MARTIN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 137 (5th ed. 1990):
To the extent that one fact must be being asserted if another that is directly
asserted is to be taken as true, both should be treated as hearsay when the direct
assertion is offered to prove the other. When one fact may be, but is not
necessarily, true if another fact is also true, a statement directly concerning only
the latter fact is not automatically treated as hearsay if offered to prove the
former; the statement only is hearsay if there is a finding that the speaker
intended to assert the implied fact.
Cf. M. GRAHAm, supra note 5, at 715; Graham, supra note 47, at 921 n.75; Wellborn,
supra note 5, at 81-83.
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Applying step two to the example above, we assume that the
proposition of fact identified in step one is false (assume there
were sufficient funds in the account when the declarant said "Don't
cash this check until Tuesday"). The test then asks whether the
declarant must have been lying or mistaken when he made the
out-of-court statement. The answer here is "No." The declarant
could have had other reasons for requesting that the listener not
cash the check until Tuesday consistent with a belief that there
were sufficient funds to cover the check if it was cashed earlier
than requested. 7 Thus, the declarant's statement would have been
a poor choice to convey the lie that there were insufficient funds
to cover the check. This reveals the kind of reduced risk of
insincerity that supports a finding that the out-of-court statement
was not an assertion of the fact in question and therefore not
hearsay under the federal definition. 76
To the extent that the inference drawn from the out-of-court
expression appears attenuated-that is, not necessary or exclusive-
the expression is a poor choice to communicate the implied fact
and thus is nonassertive when offered to prove that fact. The
attenuation, however, creates an ambiguity and the risk that the
jury will misconstrue the evidence.77
This ambiguity, however, does not create as great a concern as
the more familiar hearsay risks of insincerity or mistaken percep-
tion for several reasons. First, problems with the declarant's sin-
cerity, perception, or memory usually do not appear on the face
of the out-of-court statement and require cross-examination to be
exposed. The ambiguity faced here, however, is patent. A statement
is self-impeaching when offered to prove something it only ambi-
guously expresses. The opponent only needs closing argument, not
75. For example, the declarant may have wanted a few extra days to stop payment
on the check if conditions warranted such action, or the declarant may have believed that
the listener had no legal right to cash the check until Tuesday.
76. Although it may be more likely that the declarant wanted to delay cashing the
check because there were insufficient funds in the account, this possibility speaks to the
probative value of the evidence, not to the reduced risk of insincerity that the evidence
presents. Because this out-of-court statement would less clearly convey a lie about the
insufficiency of funds than a more direct statement of that fact, there is less danger that
this statement was chosen to express such a lie. The test directs the analysis away from
speculative attempts to determine what the declarant most likely intended to say (a matter
about which judges and lawyers can argue ad infinitum) and towards a more formal test
of whether the statement was a good choice for a person who intended to lie about the
implied proposition in question.
77. Finman, supra note 54, at 688; Maguire, supra note 3, at 760-63; Wellborn, supra
note 5, at 80-81.
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cross-examination, to point out the weakness of proponent's in-
ferences from the evidence.
Second, the heart of the hearsay danger is the risk that the jury
will overvalue hearsay evidence by crediting the declarant with
average sincerity, perception, memory, and communication skill
when cross-examination could have shown that the declarant was
below average in one or several respects.78 The use of attenuated
inferences, on the other hand, presents little danger of overvaluing
the declarant's credibility. Indeed, the ambiguity presented is not
the product of the declarant at all. It emanates from the propo-
nent's attempt to use the declarant's expression to draw a possible,
though attenuated, inference. When the declarant said "Don't cash
this check until Tuesday," his direct instruction appears unambig-
uous. The ambiguity arises only when the proponent presses this
expression into service to prove the inference that the declarant
believed there were insufficient funds to cover the check until
Tuesday. The declarant's statement suggests, but does not demand,
that inference. 79
An interesting case with which to illustrate this test for implied
assertions is United States v. Zenni.80 In Zenni, the police raided
an alleged betting parlor and, while on the premises, answered the
phone several times. The callers all tried to place bets. At trial the
prosecution sought to introduce testimony from the police regard-
ing what they heard on the phone. The issue was whether the out-
of-court statement, "Put two dollars to win on Paul Revere in the
78. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
79. Professor Wellborn says that allowing out-of-court verbal expressions only if they
are not intended as assertions has the bizarre effect of preferring less reliable evidence over
more reliable. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 80-81. The purpose of the hearsay rule, however,
is not to advance the most reliable evidence but, to insist that evidence not gain reliability
from positive assumptions that the jury probably will make about the credibility of the
declarant in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 25, § 1362. Moreover, Protessor Wellborn uses "reliable" in two different
senses. If "reliable" means that the evidence strongly proves the point for which it is
offered (a better word would be "probative"), then a nonasserted inference is less "reliable"
because it only supports the point ambiguously. If "reliable" means credible or trustworthy,
however, the direct statement carries a greater risk of insincerity than the nonasserted
inference, and thus the nonasserted inference is more "reliable."
The same is true for nonverbal conduct. Recall the earlier example in which two instances
of conduct were offered to prove that the actor owned a particular Buick. In the first, the
actor pointed to the Buick when asked which car the actor owned. In the second, the actor
was observed sitting behind the wheel of the parked Buick, reading a newspaper. The first
conduct is assertive and therefore hearsay; the latter is not. In one respect, however, the
first is more "reliable" evidence, because it directly asserts the fact in question, while the
latter only ambiguously implies ownership.
80. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
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third at Pimlico," was intended to assert that the caller believed
he had reached a betting parlor."'
The court held that the call was "nonassertive verbal conduct"
and thus not hearsay.12 The court found that "it is obvious ...
[that the caller] did not intend to make an assertion about the
fact sought to be proved or anything else." 83 This is "obvious,"
however, only if one begs the question. The federal definition
excludes nonassertive verbal conduct from the hearsay rule only
because it presents less risk of declarant insincerity. If one assumes,
as the Zenni court apparently did, that the caller was sincere, then
it is "obvious" that the caller was only trying to place a bet and
not trying to indicate his belief that he had reached a betting
parlor. If one assumes, however, that the caller was insincere then
this call was an excellent way to create the false impression that
the caller believed he had reached a betting parlor.
This statement is inadmissable hearsay under the test described
above. Under step one, the proponent offers the call to prove that
the caller believed that he had reached a betting parlor. Under
step two, assuming that the caller had not reached a betting parlor,
was the caller necessarily lying or mistaken when he placed his
bet? The answer is "Yes," and thus the call is an implied assertion
subject to the hearsay rule. The evidence fails to escape the
definition of hearsay because it does not present a reduced risk of
insincerity. Attempting to place a bet clearly indicates that the
caller believed that he had reached a betting parlor. Such a call is
a good way for a liar to fabricate evidence. Without a reduced
risk of insincerity, there is no justification under the federal
definition for keeping it outside the hearsay rules.8 4
V. DISTINGUISHING HEARSAY AND NONHEARSAY USES OF OUT-OF-
COURT STATEMENTS
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c), an out-of-court state-
ment is not hearsay if offered to prove something other than the
truth of the matter asserted. This corresponds to the common-law
doctrine that preceded the federal rules.85
81. Id. at 466 n.7.
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id. (footnote omitted).
84. For a discussion of why the calls do not qualify as nonhearsay verbal acts, see
infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
85. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 1766; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249 (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
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When an out-of-court statement is offered for a nonhearsay
purpose but also is likely to be used by the jury as proof of the
matter asserted,8 6 the statement is admissible only if the probative
value of the nonhearsay use is not substantially outweighed by the
dangers of any hearsay use of the evidence.1
Courts often fall back on common-law terminology in identifying
relevant nonhearsay uses of statement. Phrases such as "effect on
hearer"88 and "verbal act"8 9 are often helpful, but others, such as
"verbal part of an act" 9 and "circumstantial evidence of state of
mind" 9' are not. What is lacking is a single method for testing
any claim that an out-of-court statement is offered for a relevant,
nonhearsay purpose. Without such a test, courts may be tempted
to invoke the common-law terms in a conclusory and incorrect
manner.
For example, one of the most confusing and persistent relics of
the common-law effort to distinguish hearsay from nonhearsay is
the notion that evidence that is "merely circumstantial" is not
hearsay. 92 On its face, this is a distinction without a difference,
86. For example, the declarant's out-of-court statement to the physician, "My spouse
is allergic to penicillin," is relevant for the nonhearsay use of proving that the doctor had
notice that the patient might be allergic. The statement, however, also might be used by
the jury as proof that the patient was, in fact, allergic to penicillin.
87. FED. R. EVID. 403. See, e.g., United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir.
Unit B June 1981).
88. MCCORMCK, supra note 85, § 249. For example, in a medical malpractice case,
the declarant told the doctor, "My spouse is allergic to penicillin." Offered to show the
effect on the hearer, the evidence is relevant even if we assume that the declarant had no
idea whether what she said was true, because the statement still put the doctor on notice.
See United States v. Chavis, 772 F.2d 100, 105 (5th Cir. 1985); Moore v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 683 F.2d 1321, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 1982). A subset of "effect on hearer" is the use
of an out-of-court statement only to make other admissible parts of a conversation not
misleading. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 810 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1032 (1987)).
89. 4 J. WEINSTmN'S, supra note 7, J 801(c)[01]. For example, in a breach of contract
case, the declarant's statement, "We cannot ship your order," is offered as a verbal act
constituting a repudiation of a contractual obligation. It is relevant even if we assume that
the declarant had no idea whether the order could be shipped. See, e.g., Local 512,
Warehouse & Office Worker's Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 713 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Jones, 663 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1981).
90. MCCORMICK, supra note 85, § 249; M. GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 801.5, at 698
n.6.
91. M. GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 801.6, at 708-12; MCCORMICK, supra note 85, § 294;
J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 1790.
92. United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 31 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958
(1983); United States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
922 (1982); D. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 2.09 (2d ed. 1983).
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because all hearsay evidence is circumstantial.93 The fact that the
declarant said "The light was green" is circumstantial evidence
that she believed that the light was green, and this in turn is
circumstantial evidence that the light in fact was green.
The courts, however, mean "circumstantial" in the special sense
described by Wigmore. Wigmore distinguished "two great classes"
of evidence involving inferences; testimonial and circumstantial.9
Testimonial evidence depends for its value on the credibility of
the witness or declarant. Circumstantial evidence is "all offered
evidentiary facts not being assertions from which the truth of the
matters asserted is desired to be inferred." 9
Applying Wigmore's distinction to the federal definition of
hearsay says only that out-of-court statements are not hearsay
unless offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted.9 Beyond
providing a synonym for "nonhearsay," the label "circumstantial
evidence" provides little guidance for distinguishing between cir-
cumstantial and testimonial evidence. This would be innocuous if
the phrase was not invoked so often in a conclusory fashion to
declare that evidence is nonhearsay when it in fact carries the full
panoply of hearsay risks. 97
In United States v. Mazyak,91 for example, the court upheld the
admission of a letter addressed to the four defendants that wished
the defendants well on their journey with certain "precious.cargo."
The defendants were charged with importing drugs by boat. The
court stated that "[tihe letter was not introduced to prove the
truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was introduced as circum-
stantial proof that the appellants were associated with each other
and the boat.""
The court's conclusory incantation of the term "circumstantial"
and its citation to Wigmore cannot hide the hearsay use of this
evidence. The letter is circumstantial proof of the appellants'
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 309 (4th ed. 1968) ("Circumstantial evidence. The term
includes all evidence of indirect nature."); MCCORMICK, supra note 85, § 185 ("Circum-
stantial evidence may also be testimonial"); Wellborn, supra note 5, at 62; see also supra
text accompanying notes 23-25.
94. 1 J. WIoMoRE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 25 (2d ed. 1923). Wigmore noted his discomfort with the
ambiguous term "circumstantial," which he felt was "unfortunately but inevitably fixed
upon on us." Id.
95. 1 id. § 478; 3 id. § 1766.
96. 1 id. § 25; see also 3 id. § 1788.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 645-46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 846 (1976). See Wellborn, supra note 5, at 62-63 nn.78-79.
98. 650 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).
99. Id. at 792.
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association with one another and the boat if, and only if, we draw
the inferences that the declarant addressed the letter to all four
defendants because he believed them to be associated with one
another and with the boat, and from the declarant's expressed
belief in that fact we infer its truth. All of the hearsay risks are
present. If the declarant was lying or mistaken as to each defen-
dant's involvement, the evidence will mislead the trier of fact. The
declarant's unavailability for cross-examination makes it impossible
to assess these risks, leaving the trier of fact to speculate on, and
therefore perhaps overvalue, the declarant's credibility.
In United States v. Snow'00 a briefcase, to which was affixed a
red tape with the lettering "Bill Snow," was admitted to prove
that the case belonged to the defendant. °'0 The court claimed that
the name tape was not hearsay, but circumstantial evidence and a
mechanical trace. The court noted that "to exclude the name tape
as hearsay ... it would be necessary to find that the tape is a
testimonial assertion of the proscribed sort.' ' 0 2 The court never
determined, however, whether the tape was such an assertion.
Ownership of the briefcase was at issue and the "assertion of a
human being"' °3 (the person who applied the tape to the case) was
offered to prove that issue. The evidence asked the jury to assume
that whoever put the tape on the case knew what he or she was
doing, made no mistakes, and was not lying. The evidence was
thus testimonial and therefore hearsay.1 04
100. 517 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1975).
101. Id. at 443.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See also M. GRAAM, supra note 5, § 801.6, at 704. The Snow court concluded
its argument with reference to Wigmore's example of a father who has "forbidden a certain
young man to court his daughter and then one morning f[inds] on the parlor floor by the
sofa a bunch of keys with the tabooed young man's name . .. [on them]." 517 F.2d at
444. Wigmore suggested that it would be absurd to exclude such evidence on hearsay
grounds. At one level, however, the name tag on the keys constitutes testimonial evidence.
One infers from the tag that the person who made and affixed it to these keys believed
that the keys belonged to the tabooed young man. This inference is testimonial because it
plainly substitutes for an in-court assertion of the same fact. The value of the evidence
depends on the declarant's credibility and the assumption that the declarant was not lying
or mistaken.
Wigmore did not acknowledge any testimonial hearsay inferences in the tag, but simply
insisted that the tag was admissible as proof of who owned the keys. Yet, one of the
purposes of the hearsay rule is to act as an incentive for advocates to go beyond unexamined
out-of-court assertions of fact and look for more primary evidence. One hopes that even
in Wigmore's time an irate father would not rely on the tag alone but would verify that
the keys fit the young man's locks before taking any precipitous action in defense of his
daughter's honor.
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In sum, the vague distinction between hearsay and circumstantial
evidence has hindered the analysis of close hearsay questions.
Although the phrase circumstantial evidence includes many cate-
gories of nonhearsay evidence, it offers little clarity in close cases
and too often is pressed into service in a conclusory fashion to
admit hearsay. 0 5
Whether a court calls evidence "merely circumstantial," "effect
on hearer," "verbal part of an act," or just "nonhearsay," it still
must ascertain whether the statement's relevance does not, in fact,
draw on hearsay inferences.106 The following tests check whether
the offered nonhearsay use is truly free of hearsay inferences. An
out-of-court statement offered as relevant, nonhearsay evidence
must fit into one of the following two categories.'°,
A. Category One Nonhearsay: Statement Relevant for its
Objective Effect
The first category includes statements relevant for their objective
effect, regardless of the declarant's knowledge or intent. This test
covers effect on hearer, t08 verbal acts,109 and proof of demonstrably
105. See M. GRAHAm, supra note 5, § 801.6, at 703-05; Park, McCormick on Evidence
and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed by Suggestions for Law Teachers,
65 MmIN. L. REV. 423, 430-35 (1981). Likewise, the categoryof nonhearsay called "cir-
cumstantial evidence of state of mind" has proved to be confusing and subject to misuse.
3 J. WiomoRE, supra note 94, § 1790; Graham, supra note 47, at 917-20; Morgan, supra
note 4, at 206.
106. See Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1937) ("It]he courts do
not .. . get down to fundamentals .. . through the series of inferences which must be
made in the mental journey from the item of evidence to the fact which it is offered to
prove."). See, e.g., United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 969 (1987). In Giraldo, an answering machine tape that recorded calls requesting
purchases of drugs was admitted as nonhearsay because it was not offered to prove the
matters asserted, but "to show that it was more likely than not that the cocaine possessed
by Giraldo was possessed for purposes of distribution." Id. at 213. The calls only prove
this, however, if the hearsay inference is drawn that the callers believed that they were
leaving messages for a drug dealer. See also United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 469
(E.D. Ky. 1980); M. GRAHsm, supra note 5, § 801.6, at 706 n.13.
107. A third category of relevant nonhearsay use, prior inconsistent and consistent
statements used to impeach or rehabilitate the credibility of a witness, is not problematic
in its application and requires no test to confirm it. See, e.g., United States v. Rohrer,
708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lay, 644 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 869 (1981); United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 830 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978). Under Rule 801(d)(1), if the declarant is available
for cross-examination, prior consistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence,
FED. R. EVID. 801(dXl)(B), as are prior inconsistent statements that were made under oath
at a trial, deposition, or other proceeding. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(i)(A).
108. See supra note 88.
109. See supra note 89.
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false statements.' 0 The test for this category assures that the
relevance of the evidence is not drawing on hearsay inferences by
negating the critical hearsay premise that declarants usually believe
what they say."' The test asks us to assume that unbeknownst to
the listener or reader, the declarant had no idea what she was
saying. Next, the test asks whether that assumption destroys the
relevance of the statement. If the evidence is truly relevant for its
objective effect, the assumption that the declarant had no idea
what she was saying should not destroy its relevance.
For example, the proponent offers the declarant's out-of-court
statement to the defendant doctor, "My wife is allergic to peni-
cillin," for the nonhearsay purpose of showing notice. The evidence
passes the test. If we assume that the declarant had no idea what
he was saying it does not destroy the relevance of the statement.
Regardless of what the declarant knew or did not know, his
statement put the doctor on notice that the patient might be allergic
to penicillin and the doctor's subsequent professional conduct
should be evaluated in light of that fact.
On the other hand, suppose that the prosecution in United States
v. Zenni"t2 argued that the caller's statement "Put two dollars on
Paul Revere to win in the third at Pimlico," was not hearsay but
a "verbal act.""' 3 Using the test outlined above, we assume that
the caller had no idea what he was saying. With that assumption
in place, the relevance of the evidence is lost. Although labeling
the call a "verbal act" might sound good on the surface, the test
shows that the statement acquires its relevance only by drawing
on the hearsay inference that the caller believed he had reached a
110. For example, in a robbery case the prosecution offers the statement of the
defendant's spouse on the day of the robbery, "Joe is out of town," to prove, together
with independent evidence that Joe was not out of town, that the defendant's spouse was
lying or mistaken about the defendant's whereabouts at the time in question. Even if we
assume that the declarant had no idea where Joe was when she made the statement, the
fact that she made an incorrect assertion regarding his whereabouts is relevant. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-20 (1974); United States v. Adkins, 741 F.2d
744, 746 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
Some suggest that this statement is hearsay because its relevance is based on the
assumption that the declarant believed that her statement was false and that she was
concocting an alibi. This assumption involves the hearsay risks that the declarant was lying
or mistaken. M. GRAHAm, supra note 5, § 801.10, at 719, n.3. The federal definition of
hearsay, however, does not extend this far. It only polices the assertive use of out-of-court
expressions; what the declarant intends to communicate. There is no sense in which the
declarant used the expression "Joe is out of town" in order to assert her belief that the
statement was false.
I ll. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
112. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
113. See MCCORMICK, supra note 85, at 249.
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betting parlor. If the caller was lying or mistaken, the evidence is
not only irrelevant, but also misleading.
B. Category Two Nonhearsay: Demonstrated Evidence of
Declarant's State of Mind
The second category of nonhearsay covers cases in which what
the declarant said or agreed to say demonstrates a relevant fact
about her state of mind.' 4 For example, in United States v.
Lieberman' the defendant allegedly was part of a large conspiracy
to import and distribute marijuana. The prosecution presented
evidence strongly linking Robert D'Ambra to the drug operation.
Part of the case against Lieberman was linking him to D'Ambra.
The prosecution offered evidence that someone checked into the
Newport Resort Hotel, filled out a registration card with the name
"Robert D'Ambra," listed an address that was independently
verified as D'Ambra's, and later made a call from this hotel room
to Lieberman's unlisted phone number. The prosecution invited
the jury to infer some association between D'Ambra and the
defendant. The defense objected, claiming that the hotel registra-
tion card was hearsay.
The registration card sustains both hearsay and nonhearsay
inferences. The hearsay inference invites us to accept what the
declarant said as true; he said that he was Robert D'Ambra because
he was D'Ambra. The nonhearsay inference is that the declarant
was someone who at least knew D'Ambra's correct name and
address. This inference is not based on the truth of the statement
but on the declarant's ability to state certain facts correctly. From
this the jury could infer that the declarant was D'Ambra or
someone associated with him. The nonhearsay inference is possible
only because there was independent evidence that D'Ambra's ad-
dress on the registration card was correct. '1 6
The following test for category two nonhearsay helps police the
imprecise and sometimes reckless use of such terms as "circum-
114. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1106 (1985) (fact that declarant agreed to say "I have a plane on my
property" in front of a group of people is evidence the declarant was not hiding the fact
and this, in turn, indicated a lack of knowledge on his part that the plane was stolen);
United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981) (fact that defendant was able to
correctly identify Bob Staratt as a narcotics agent relevant to support defense that defendant
thought he was working for Staratt); M. GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 801.6, at 707-08;
MCCORMICK, supra note 85, § 249.
115. 637 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1980).
116. See United States v. Garcia-Duarte, 718 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1983); M. GRAHAM,
supra note 5, § 801.6, at 707-08.
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stantial evidence of state of mind." It screens out efforts to use
hearsay inferences to prove the declarant's state of mind17 and
instances in which the declarant's state of mind is relevant only
to support a further inference of some objective fact, thus raising
all the hearsay risks.
The test for this category of nonhearsay has three parts. First,
there must exist some independent evidence that supports the truth
of all or some relevant part of the declarant's statement.' Second,
we assume that the independent evidence is incontrovertible. Fi-
nally, we ask whether this assumption makes the declarant's state-
ment merely cumulative evidence or whether the statement is still
relevant as proof that the declarant was able or agreed to make
the statement.
For example, a prosecutor needs to prove that Sally knew where
Joe lived. The prosecutor offers a witness who testifies that Sally
told her that Joe lived on Oak Avenue. Applying the test, we need
independent evidence that Joe in fact lived on Oak Avenue." '9 If
we assume that this independent evidence is incontrovertible, would
Sally's statement become merely cumulative? It does not. Sally's
out-of-court statement is still relevant because it shows that she
was able to give Joe's correct address, and this demonstrates that
she knew where Joe lived.
Compare another example involving a tax fraud case in which
the defendant offers a statement he made to his spouse while
working on the tax return, "I don't want to cheat on my taxes,"
as nonhearsay proof of his innocent state of mind at the time.
This sounds appealing. The defendant's statement is consistent
with, and therefore circumstantial evidence of, an innocent state
of mind. This is true, however, only if we draw the hearsay
inferences that the defendant is saying what he truly believes and
117. Statements such as "I am angry" are hearsay, but fall under the exception in
FED. R. EVID. 803(3) as a statement of a then existing physical, emotional, or mental
condition. Statements of belief are also hearsay and come within the 803(3) exception only
if not offered to prove the truth of the matter believed.
118. When a statement is offered to prove the declarant knew of someone or some
thing, the independent evidence requirement is satisfied if the person or thing mentioned
in fact exists. Thus the statement, "I bought this at Chase Hardware," when offered for
the nonhearsay purpose of proving that the declarant knew of Chase Hardware, satisfies
the independent evidence requirement if Chase Hardware in fact exists.
119. To use Sally's statement to prove that she knew where Joe lived, independent
evidence must show that the statement was accurate. We cannot turn to the statement itself
to prove its own accuracy because this would be based only on the hearsay inferences that
the declarant said what she believed and what she believed was probably true. Only with
independent confirmation can the out-of-court evidence demonstrate the declarant's knowl-
edge or ability regarding the matter in question.
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that what he believes is true. Applying the test, if we assume that
there is independent, incontrovertible evidence that the defendant
did not want to cheat on his taxes, the defendant's statement loses
its relevance; it is needlessly cumulative. This demonstrates that
the statement has no relevance outside of using hearsay inferences
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
VI. APPLICATIONS
Applying the methods'described above for distinguishing asser-
tive from nonassertive evidence and hearsay from relevant non-
hearsay provides the coherence and consistency that is missing
from many court opinions analyzing difficult hearsay issues. An
analysis of the following four federal appeals court cases demon-
strates the need for and usefulness of a critical, tested approach
for discerning hearsay from nonhearsay under the federal defini-
tion.
In United States v. Day,120 the prosecution offered the testimony
of a witness who saw the victim shortly before the murder. The
victim handed the witness a piece of paper on which was written
"Beanny, Eric, 635-3135" and told the witness to call the police
and give them this note if he was not back by three o'clock the
next day.
Two out-of-court expressions were present in Day: what the
note said, and what the victim said to the witness while passing
the note. The two expressions must be analyzed separately. The
prosecution argued that the note was nonhearsay, offered not to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to show that the victim
knew Beanny and Eric.' 2' As purported nonhearsay, the evidence
must pass the test for one of the two categories of nonhearsay.
The test for category one, 22 however, is clearly not met. If we
assume that the declarant had no idea what he was writing when
he made the note, that assumption directly destroys any relevance
the note may have.
The test for category two nonhearsay 23 first asks whether there
is independent evidence verifying that what the note says is true-
that Beanny and Eric do have this particular phone number. If
there is such independent evidence and we assume it is incontro-
vertibly true, the test asks whether that assumption makes the note
irrelevant, merely cumulative evidence. It does not. The note is
120. 591 F.2d 861, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
121. Id. at 883, 885.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
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not being used to prove the defendants' phone number, but to
show that the victim possessed the correct phone number and
therefore probably knew the defendants.
The court reached the same result, admitting the note as non-
hearsay, but its reasoning was questionable. The court stated that
"the words [on the note] do not assert anything except that Beanny
and/or Eric might have a particular telephone number."' 24 The
confusion begins here. To say that the note only asserts that
Beanny and Eric might have that particular phone number is to
purposefully misdescribe the conventions of language used by the
declarant. When a person writes a name and number on a note
and passes it to another, the normal use of that act is to assert
that the person named has (not "might have") this particular
phone number.
The court misdescribed what the note asserted because it wanted
to neutralize its assertive nature. 125 The court's confusion deepened
as it argued that the relevance of the note did not depend on the
truth of what the note said. There was no independent evidence
verifying that the phone number was correct! If this was not
Beanny and Eric's phone number, then the evidence suggests that
the victim did not know Beanny and Eric very well, or at least
not well enough to have their correct phone number. The non-
hearsay relevance of the note heavily depended on the accuracy of
the phone number. If the prosecution relied solely on the note to
establish that accuracy, then the note was hearsay. If the prose-
cution, however, had independently established the accuracy of
the phone number, then that fact, together with the victim's
possession of the note, suggests some relationship between the
victim and the defendant. Because the majority used faulty rea-
soning to reach a correct result, it lost the dissenter, Judge Ro-
binson, who was not convinced that the note was relevant as
nonhearsay. '26
The second piece of evidence at issue was the witness's testimony
that, as the victim handed him the note, the victim said, "If I'm
not back by three o'clock tomorrow, call the police, tell them
what I said, and give them this number.' ' 27 The prosecution might
have argued that what the victim said was not offered to prove
the truth of anything asserted, but only for the fact that it was
said. The evidence, however, does not qualify as relevant non-
124. Day, 591 F.2d at 883.
125. Id. at 883-84 n.43.
126. Id. at 894.
127. Id. at 881.
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hearsay. Under the test for category one, if we assume that the
victim had no idea what he was saying, it destroys the relevance
of the statement. The prosecution might have argued that the
statement explained the witness's subsequent conduct of calling
the police when the victim did not return, but there is no need to
explain the witness's conduct because it is not in issue.
The statement also fails the test for category two nonhearsay as
circumstantial evidence of the victim's state of mind. If we assume
that there is independent, incontrovertible evidence that what the
victim's statement suggested-that he had reason to believe that
the defendants might harm him-was true, then the victim's state-
ment is needless, cumulative evidence. The relevant issue is not
whether the victim believed that the defendants might harm him,
but whether what the victim believed was in fact true.
Finding no relevant nonhearsay use, the prosecution could have
attempted to avoid the hearsay rule by arguing that the victim's
statement was not being offered for what it asserted but rather to
prove the nonasserted implication that the victim believed he had
reason to fear the defendants. Applying the test described above
for distinguishing between assertions and nonassertions,' 28 the pro-
ponent offers the statement to prove that the declarant victim
believed that Beanny and Eric might harm him. The test asks us
to assume that what the declarant believed was incontrovertibly
false; that is, to assume that Beanny and Eric were not at all likely
to harm the declarant. In that case, was the declarant necessarily
lying or mistaken when the statement was made to the witness?
The answer is "Yes." What the victim said makes no sense unless
the victim believed Beanny and Eric might harm him. The state-
ment and the context in which it was made would have been a
good choice for a liar attempting to communicate the false infer-
ence that there were reasons to fear that the defendants might
harm him. Thus, this use of the victim's statement does not present
the reduced risks of insincerity required for evidence to qualify as
nonassertive under the federal definition of hearsay. The court in
Day reached the same result, finding that the government was
offering the out-of-court expression to prove the inference that the
victim feared the defendants.1 29
In United States v. Singer,130 the defendants were charged with
drug related offenses. 3' The prosecution wanted to prove that the
128. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76.
129. Day, 591 F.2d at 881-83.
130. 687 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1982), different result on rehearing on other grounds, 710
F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at 1137.
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two defendants lived together at a particular address by offering
a letter in an envelope addressed to the two defendants from their
landlord terminating the tenancy.1 32 The letter does not qualify as
relevant nonhearsay under either category. Under the category one
test, if we assume that the person who addressed the letter had
no idea what she was writing, the letter's relevance is destroyed.
Under the test for category two, assuming that there was incon-
trovertible evidence that what the letter said was true and that the
defendants did live at that address, the letter is needless, cumulative
evidence.
Nor can the letter qualify as some sort of nonassertive evidence.
The proponent offered the letter to prove that the declarant
believed the defendants lived at that address. 33 Under our test, if
we assume that they did not live at that address, it follows that
the declarant was necessarily lying or mistaken in addressing the
letter. There is no reduced risk of insincerity evidenced here, so
the letter is hearsay.
The court held that the letter was not hearsay. 34 It reasoned
that:
If this letter were submitted to assert the implied truth of its written
contents-that Carlos Almaden lived at 600 Wilshire-it would be hear-
say and inadmissible. It is, however, admissible nonhearsay because its
purpose is to imply from the landlord's behavior-his mailing a letter
to "Carlos Almaden," 600 Wilshire-that "Almaden" lived there.'"
The court unsuccessfully tried to free the letter from the hearsay
rule by focusing on the landlord's nonverbal conduct of mailing
the letter. The only evidence, however, that the landlord mailed
the letter was the hearsay inference that the return address was
true and accurate. Moreover, the nonverbal conduct of mailing a
letter is irrelevant without the written assertion of to whom and
at what address the letter was to be sent.
The form of the court's argument has unacceptable implications.
For example, to prove that Joe is a good shot, the proponent
offers into evidence a certificate issued by Fred's Shooting Range
which says that Joe is an excellent shot. This is hearsay of course.
Under the Singer court's argument, however, the certificate is not
offered to prove its specific written content (that Joe is an excellent
shot), but only to prove Fred's behavior in giving such a certificate
to Joe. From this the jury can infer that Fred believed what the






certificate said. Admitting evidence like this creates a giant new
hole in the hearsay rule.
In United States v. Martinez, 36 the defendant was charged with
attempted murder. The prosecution offered the testimony of a
prison inmate informant, McNeil, that the defendant contacted
him about arranging a murder. Cross-examination brought out
that the witness had done a great deal of past informing against
other prisoners and prison guards. The implication was that the
witness had a history of making charges against others. On redirect,
in an effort to rehabilitate McNeil's credibility, the prosecution
asked about the disposition of the charges McNeil made against
the prison guards. McNeil replied that all of the guards pled guilty.
The defendant objected to this evidence as hearsay.
The prosecution argued that the pleas were nonhearsay because
they were offered not for their truth, but for the mere fact that
they were made. The court agreed.'37 The pleas, however, do not
qualify for either category of relevant nonhearsay. They fail the
test for category one because, if we assume that the guards had
no idea what they were saying, the relevance of the evidence is
destroyed. They are not admissible as verbal acts because, while
pleading guilty has certain objective, legal consequences, none of
those consequences was relevant in this case. The guilty pleas only
rehabilitate McNeil if we draw the inference that the guards
believed that his accusations were true, from which we infer that
his accusations were in fact true. The witness's credibility is not
supported if the guards were lying or mistaken when they entered
their pleas. If they pled guilty to very minor charges for reasons
of convenience, even though they believed that the charges were
baseless, the pleas do not support McNeil's credibility.'
The guilty pleas also fail the test for category two nonhearsay
as circumstantial evidence of the guards' states of mind. If we
assume that there was independent, incontrovertible evidence that
136. 775 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1985).
137. Id. at 37.
138. A court understandably might wish to admit the guilty pleas because if the charges
were at all serious, the inference that the guards believed that there was some merit to the
charges is quite reliable. The guards were unlikely to lie or make a mistake on a matter
of such personal importance. FED. R. EviD. 803(22) recognizes this increased reliability in
serious cases and provides a hearsay exception to admit them. The rule, however, forbids
prosecutorial use of judgments against anyone other than the accused, when offered for
purposes other than impeachment. The Martinez court would have been on far more
coherent grounds had it argued that the guards' guilty pleas were offered for purposes of




the guards were in fact guilty, the pleas are cumulative and
irrelevant. Although it is tempting to say that the guilty pleas are
offered only to prove the guards' consciousness of guilt, this test
shows that the real object of interest is not whether the guards
believed they were guilty, but whether what the guards believed
was true.
The court admitted the guards' guilty pleas as nonhearsay,
claiming that the evidence was not offered to prove that the guards
were in fact guilty. The court stated that "[w]hether or not each
of the guards was in fact guilty, . . . [the witness's] credibility was
supported by the fact that all those . . . guards chose to plead
guilty rather than to stand trial."' 3 9 The court appears to argue
that people do not normally plead guilty unless there is at least
some merit to the charges against them. This, however, is a hearsay
inference.' 40 Suppose several of the guards said, "McNeil has made
true charges against us." Following the court's argument, these
statements are not hearsay because whether or not the charges
were true, the witness's credibility was supported by the fact that
the guards chose to say this rather than protest their innocence.
Finally, in United States v. Reynolds,14' the defendant was
charged with possession of stolen unemployment insurance checks.
The prosecution offered the testimony of a postal inspector that
after he arrested the defendant's alleged co-conspirator and as the
defendant approached them, the co-conspirator said to the defen-
dant, "I didn't tell them anything about you.' ' 42 The defense
objected on hearsay grounds.
This statement does not qualify as nonhearsay. Using the test
for category one, if we assume that the declarant had no idea
what he was saying, his statement is irrelevant. Under the test for
category two, even if there was incontrovertible evidence that what
the declarant said was true-that he really said nothing to the
police about Reynolds-this fact is simply irrelevant. The relevance
of the statement is in what it implies-that Reynolds was involved
in criminal activity. Thus, the real issue is whether this implication
is an assertion under the federal definition of hearsay.
Using the test for assertions, the proponent offers the statement
to prove that the declarant believed Reynolds was involved in
criminal activity. If we assume that Reynolds was not involved in
criminal activity, must the declarant have been lying or mistaken
139. Martinez, 775 F.2d at 37.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.




when he said to Reynolds "I didn't tell them anything about
you"?
Although this is a close case, the better answer is "Yes." In
this context, the statement appears to express the declarant's belief
that there were things the declarant could but did not tell the
police about the defendant's criminal activities. Therefore, the
statement would be a reasonably good choice for a liar attempting
to falsely implicate the defendant in the crime. Without a reduction
in the risk of insincerity, the statement should not qualify as
nonassertive under the federal definition of hearsay.
The court held that the statement was hearsay. The opinion
includes a good discussion of implied assertions and why a defi-
nition of hearsay must include these assertions to some extent.
Under Reynolds, if an implication must be true in order for the
out-of-court expression to be relevant, then the proponent is of-
fering that expression to prove that implication and the expression
is hearsay. 43 While the court cited Morgan's theory of implied
assertions for authority, it did not explain how Morgan's theory
is incorporated in Federal Rule of Evidence 801. Additionally, the
court failed to recognize that just as Federal Rule of Evidence 801
sets limits on the classification of nonverbal conduct as hearsay,
it also sets limits on the classification of implied assertions as
hearsay.
All four of these cases presented difficult hearsay issues and
provoked widely varied, and in some cases, very confusing ap-
proaches. Applying the methods and tests described in this Article
to each of the cases illustrates that asking the right questions
sharpens the true issues and keeps the analysis focused.
VII. CONCLUSION
After nearly fifteen years with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
courts and commentators still do not agree on the proper inter-
pretation of the federal definition of hearsay.1" Some courts ignore
the definition and dip back into pre-Federal Rules sources to
resolve difficult hearsay questions. The result is a doctrinal free-
for-all that leads to inconsistent results and squanders judicial
credibility.
Blaming the confusion on the poorly drafted federal definition
and the cryptic advisory committee notes is not entirely fair.
143. Id. at 102.
144. See Wellborn, supra note 5, at 72 ("The machine as constructed will not run very
well if skilled mechanics cannot concur in describing it.").
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Hearsay confounded courts long before the Federal Rules of
Evidence were adopted. The kinds of discriminations called for in
close hearsay questions are far more intricate and subtle than many
judges have the time or inclination to entertain. The interpretation
of the federal definition and methods for applying it presented in
this Article attempt to organize and simplify that task. McCormick
wrote in connection with defining hearsay that "simplification has
a measure of falsification.' 11 5 Experience with the hearsay rule
proves that complexity has a measure of impracticality. Our efforts
to tame the hearsay rule should concentrate on the middle ground.
145. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 225 (1954).
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